Neurolaw and criminal responsibility: A forensic analysis of neurocognitive functioning

Abstract

Despite advances in neuroscience, a gap exists in current forensic practice: the absence of standardized methodological criteria for translating neurocognitive findings into valid assessments of criminal responsibility. In court proceedings, when expert testimony is presented, the defense often employs deterministic arguments that seek via a direct causal link to equate any brain anomaly with an exemption from punishment. Biological evidence is frequently used in legal arguments to establish a lack of criminal culpability. Consequently, this article aims to propose a structured model for neurocognitive assessment applicable to forensic practice. The methodology was based on an applied theoretical approach, utilizing a documentary review design and thematic analysis. The literature search covered scientific publications from the last six years found in databases such as Dialnet and Scielo. The study confirmed the lack of a standardized protocol linking neuroscience to criminal responsibility. In response, an integrative model was formulated, structured across three levels: standardized neurocognitive assessment, contextualized functional analysis, and dynamic behavioral modeling. This approach mitigates the risk of over-attributing behavior to brain function by explicitly distinguishing the technical measurement of a subject's capabilities from the normative attribution of criminal responsibility, which falls within the legal domain. The study concludes that the forensic value of neurolaw lies in models that, through epistemological analysis, preserve the boundary between the scientific explanation of behavior and the judicial decision.